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Tax Structures, Economic Growth and Development  
 
Kyle McNabb and Philippe LeMay-Boucher 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between tax structures and economic growth in a 
panel of developed and developing countries. In order to raise revenue, low-income 
countries have historically relied more heavily on international trade taxes, whilst richer 
nations employ comparatively more consumption and income taxes. Using the new 
Government Revenue Dataset (GRD) from the International Centre for Tax and Development 
(ICTD), we consider the effects of revenue-neutral changes in tax structure on economic 
growth for a panel of over 100 countries with data covering the period 1980-2010. Results 
from the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CMG) estimator (Pesaran 2006) find that 
increases in income taxes (specifically personal income taxes) offset by reductions in trade 
or consumption taxes have had a negative impact on GDP growth rates. We also highlight 
the fact that trade liberalisation has not had any discernible positive effects on economic 
growth. Revenue-neutral increases in personal income taxes are found to be particularly 
harmful in middle- and low-income countries. Taken alongside the results of, for example, 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010), this is a reminder of the difficulties of tax reform for developing 
countries.  
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Introduction 
 
The past thirty years have seen sweeping changes in the means by which many countries 
collect fiscal revenues. From a heavy reliance on trade taxes in the early 1980s, many low-
income countries, with guidance and support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
have changed focus to increase the use of consumption taxes such as Value Added Tax 
(VAT). The impact of such structural shifts on economic growth is intriguing. Whilst the vast 
majority of studies in this area have focused only on Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, the new Government Revenue Dataset (GRD) from the 
ICTD, rich with information on revenue streams in developing countries, allows us to assess 
the impact of revenue-neutral shifts in tax structure on historic per capita GDP growth rates 
in a panel of over 100 countries. 
 
Authorities in developing countries are faced with a very challenging set of circumstances 
when it comes to tax collection. Issues such as weak administration, low literacy levels, low 
population density and a large shadow economy necessitate that not only is overall revenue 
low but the tax structure is less reliant on income taxes, with a heavier weight placed upon 
trade taxes that are more easily collected. Trends in the data show that low- and middle-
income countries have seen large changes in their tax structures since 1980, yet richer 
nations have had a relatively stable tax composition. The on-going trends of globalisation 
and IMF support for a move towards consumption taxes have been instrumental in seeing 
low- and middle-income countries’ reliance on trade taxes decrease. Yet questions remain 
over the impact of such structural shifts in taxation: Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) highlight 
that revenue recovery following the changes in low-income countries has been poor; less still 
is known about the impacts on GDP growth.  
 
The endogenous growth models of, inter alios, Mendoza et al. (1997) provide a theoretical 
background for this study. They predict that taxes on corporate or personal income distort 
decisions leading to productive investments in human or physical capital to a greater extent 
than consumption taxes. Therefore, it is interesting to see if such effects show up in an 
empirical context. However the disparity between theory and empirics is one issue that must 
be overcome: the relevant theoretical models rely on marginal tax rates, yet these are not 
readily available (or easily identifiable) for a large panel of countries. Similarly, including the 
tax ratio (i.e. total revenue as a percentage of GDP) is a rather crude proxy for the tax rate. 
We thus examine the effects of revenue-neutral changes in the tax structure (i.e. holding total 
receipts constant); results from the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CMG) 
estimator (Pesaran 2006), which allows for full country heterogeneity and accounts for cross-
sectional dependencies, suggest that shifts away from trade and consumption towards 
income taxes have had negative impacts on GDP growth rates. Specifically, we find that this 
effect is felt most strongly through personal income taxes (PIT). Therefore we are able to 
present new evidence, highlighting the potentially harmful effects of trade liberalisation on 
GDP growth rates.  
 
The following Sections (1 and 2) provide an overview of the relevant theoretical predictions 
and empirical evidence that exists with regard to fiscal policy and growth. Section 3 
considers the specific issues relevant to developing countries with regard to revenue 
mobilisation. In Section 4 we present some descriptive statistics and a graphical analysis of 
the recent trends in tax structures. The following Section (5) discusses the econometric 
issues with large N, large T panels, and provides justification for our choice of empirical 
strategy. The results, and a discussion, are presented in Section 6. Section 7 examines 
some of the inherent limitations of the present work, before Section 8 concludes. 
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1  Theoretical predictions 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the theoretical predictions surrounding the 
relationship between taxation and output growth.1 In terms of the level of taxation, that is to 
say tax revenue expressed as a percentage of GDP, it is not immediately clear whether a 
higher level of taxes would have a positive or negative effect on output. Whilst higher tax 
rates distort the incentive for individuals and firms to engage in activities that contribute 
towards higher levels of output, higher revenue can provide the government with a greater 
ability to design policies that can increase the productive capacity of the economy (such as 
investment in education and training, or subsidies for research and development). Thus, the 
relationship between the levels of taxation and output is more likely to be determined by 
‘societal choices as to the appropriate level of public spending’ (Arnold et al. 2011: F59).  
The neoclassical growth model (inter alios Swan 1956; Solow 1956) does not provide scope 
for assessing the potential for fiscal policy to affect the long-run steady-state growth rate; in 
this model a change in the tax rate may lead to a shift in the steady-state growth path, but 
not in its slope. This is illustrated in King and Rebelo (1990), who calibrate the neoclassical 
model with parameters consistent with the long-run US experience to show that an increase 
in an output tax from 20 to 30 per cent leads to a new, lower steady-state growth path.2 In 
order to find theoretical predictions of the effects of fiscal policy on output growth, however, 
one must look to works such as Barro (1990), King and Rebelo (1990) or Mendoza et al. 
(1997). Specifically, these models consider changes in the tax rate. King and Rebelo’s model 
(1990: 130) considers the effects of a rise in the ‘output tax rate applied equally to all sectoral 
activities’. The authors conclude that whilst ‘taxation may affect the growth rate in a 
quantitatively important way … the magnitude of this influence depends … on the production 
and tax structure’ (King and Rebelo 1990: 140). The endogenous growth model outlined in 
Mendoza et al. (1997) however goes further, in that it considers the effects of marginal tax 
rates on physical capital, human capital and consumption. The model predicts that whilst all 
three affect the ‘net after-tax rate of return on physical capital’, consumption taxes will do so 
only indirectly through the labour-leisure choice, which in turn affects the ratio of capital to 
labour used in production. Higher consumption taxes increase the cost of consumer goods, 
in turn reducing the reward for working, thus impacting the labour supply (Arnold et al. 2011). 
Taxes on physical or human capital, however, influence growth through both direct effects on 
labour supply and indirect effects on the labour-leisure choice.3 Whilst the magnitude of 
these impacts is dependent on factors such as the elasticity of labour supply, the predictions 
of the model are clear: there are fewer channels through which consumption taxes can 
distort growth (as measured by the return on physical capital) than with the other two tax 
categories. 
Arnold et al. (2011) also regard consumption taxes to be the least harmful to growth in the 
sense that they do not discourage savings or investment. The authors consider that personal 
income taxes (PIT) are more detrimental to growth than consumption taxes, but not to the 
extent of corporate income taxes (CIT), which are viewed as the most harmful. It is also 
suggested that higher rates of PIT reduce the incentive to save, which, at least to some 
extent, reduces the finance available to small businesses, limiting their growth potential.4 
Corporate income taxes are considered to be the least growth-friendly, in the sense that they 
																																																								
1  A comprehensive review can be found in Myles (2007). 
2  See King and Rebelo (1990: 131 Figure 1). 
3  See Mendoza et al (1997:102-106) for detailed derivations and results. 
4  This point might also be made for consumption taxes. Higher VAT rates (for example) might discourage consumers 
from purchasing expensive items. If consumers choose to save those funds that would otherwise have been spent, then 
this might improve the liquidity available to small and medium-sized enterprises. Thus the negative effect on growth of 
reduced consumption expenditure might, at least to some extent, be offset by better lending conditions for small 
businesses. 
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discourage investments most important for growth – such as in capital or improvements in 
productivity. Furthermore, Arnold et al. (2011) consider that CIT provisions may exist to divert 
resources from the industries where they make the most significant contribution to growth. 
One feature of the models mentioned above (and, indeed, with much of the empirical 
literature) is that they make little explicit attempt to incorporate the role of trade taxes. Given 
the wide developing country coverage at our disposal, this is an issue on which we need to 
focus. There are, however, a few easily identifiable channels through which trade taxes affect 
the investment decisions that lead to growth. Indeed, as it turns out, the distortions created 
by trade taxes can be viewed as analogous to those created by corporation or consumption 
taxes. Consider, firstly, a high prevalence of protectionist tariffs, which might imply that 
resources are flowing to inefficient industries where it might not otherwise be profitable to 
operate. To the extent that this distorts the flow of human or physical capital, import tariffs 
can be viewed as distorting the investment necessary for growth. Thus these taxes can be 
considered to have similar effects as PIT or CIT. Todaro and Smith (2009) consider that an 
import duty might actually serve as a proxy for taxes on corporate profits, in the sense that 
companies relying on imports for inputs in the production process are not always able to 
pass on the full burden of the tariff to consumers. To the extent that import duties are passed 
on to consumers through higher prices, the effect of such a tax is analogous to that of 
domestic consumption taxes such as VAT. The aforementioned authors consider export 
duties as an effective means of taxing the profits of firms who sell their produce abroad, 
whilst also noting that there is a clear trade-off between raising revenue and discouraging 
firms from exporting their produce; the efficiency gains from exposure to international trade 
have obvious implications for growth. 
It is thus clear that trade taxes can foster significant distortions in terms of the flow of human 
and physical capital. The extent (and direction) of the effect on growth of trade taxes is 
however dependent on the trade patterns of the country in question. Economies that rely 
more heavily on imports or exports will have a greater potential to influence economic growth 
through protectionist trade policies than will a more closed economy. This distinction is 
particularly relevant for developing economies, many of which are heavily reliant on trade 
and, as such, on revenue from trade taxes. The features of fiscal policy specific to 
developing countries are discussed in detail in Section 3 below.  
The aforementioned endogenous growth models provide a sound theoretical basis for 
examining the effects of various tax categories on economic growth (or, at the very least, the 
investment decisions that influence growth). The work of Mendoza et al. (1997) is particularly 
illustrative of the various distortions to growth arising from the choice of tax rate. A major 
issue however lies in the fact that their model deals with marginal tax rates. There thus exists 
somewhat of a disparity between the theoretical and empirical literature, as data on tax rates 
is not readily available for a large number of countries over a long time period. The next 
section details the attempts that have been made to overcome this issue. 
 
 
2  Empirical findings  
Following Easterly and Rebelo’s claim (1993: 442) that ‘The evidence that tax rates matter 
for growth is disturbingly fragile’, the empirical growth literature has made great strides 
towards more accurately isolating the effects of changes in taxation. Improvements in both 
the quality and quantity of data have improved the options available to researchers. It 
certainly appears at this point that, contrary to Easterly and Rebelo’s claim, taxes do matter 
for growth; which taxes, where and by how much they affect growth are perhaps the more 
stimulating questions. This section contains an overview of the empirical evidence, and 
provides an assessment of the results reported to date. 
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Early studies examining the relationship between tax and growth simply included tax receipts 
as a share of GDP as a regressor. Plosser (1992) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) both find 
a negative relationship between income taxes and growth. Yet both authors advise caution in 
interpreting the results as causal. The former points to the problem of collinearity among 
explanatory variables, whilst Easterly and Rebelo (1993) warn that their result was heavily 
dependent on the other covariates included. 
 
As outlined above, there are various shortcomings with using tax receipts’ share of GDP as 
the fiscal variable of interest. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) recognise that this can only be 
interpreted as the marginal rate of, for example, income tax, if income taxes were 
proportional. Martinez-Mongay (2000) argues that the main problem with using this method is 
that GDP itself is determined by the income from labour and capital. Furthermore, he notes 
that disaggregating individual tax flows into their share of GDP is also a poor proxy, as 
changes in these figures could be a result of either a change in the tax rate or a change in 
the relevant tax base’s share of GDP, which might not necessarily be a result of tax law. 
Kneller et al. (1999) claim that the majority of previous research ignores the fact that by 
focusing on just one side of the budget (i.e. on expenditure or taxation, but not both) results 
may be biased. They classify taxation as ‘distortionary’ or ‘non-distortionary’, and spending 
as ‘productive’ or ‘non-productive’, predicting that shifts towards the latter form of taxation 
(from distortionary) will have a positive effect on growth, as will shifts towards productive 
expenditure (from non-productive).5 The premise of this classification lies in their claim that 
the ‘most relevant distortions’ come from the incentives to invest rather than the labour-
leisure choice, which is the only facet affected by consumption taxes. With these four 
categories specified as explanatory variables, along with a balancing item (budget surplus), 
the authors proceed to omit the categories predicted to have a negligible effect on growth, 
namely the non-productive expenditure or non-distortionary taxes. The interpretation of 
results thus implies that a unit change in one of the included fiscal variables is necessarily 
‘offset by a unit change in the omitted category’ (Kneller et al. 1999: 175). Results suggest 
that distortionary taxes do indeed retard GDP growth, whereas productive expenditure has 
the opposite effect. Estimates point to an increase in GDP growth of between 0.1 and 0.2 per 
cent following a 1 per cent decrease in distortionary taxation. Furthermore, they illustrate that 
ignoring one side of the budget can cause serious bias in the coefficient estimates, even 
flipping the sign of the coefficient on the variable in question. These results hold after 
rigorous robustness checks in Bleaney et al. (2001). In the sense that each of the tax and 
expenditure categories is expressed as a share of GDP, the results share the same 
limitations as previous studies. However these authors take great strides towards addressing 
any biases that might arise by also including expenditure as an independent variable. By and 
large, the result that increases in distortionary taxation, offset by decreases in non-
distortionary revenue, are harmful to GDP growth is in line with the theoretical predictions of 
Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Mendoza et al. (1997). 
 
More accurate estimates of the marginal tax rate than can be provided by simply expressing 
revenue as a share of GDP are difficult to achieve. In order to fully and accurately estimate 
the effects of tax rates on GDP, one would require information not only on each of the 
marginal rates but also on the income distribution, which, for a large sample of countries over 
many years, is difficult to obtain or accurately estimate. Attempts have however been made: 
Lee and Gordon (2005) use the top corporate tax rate, finding a negative and significant 
relationship with per capita GDP growth. Coefficient estimates point to around a 0.6 
percentage point increase in growth arising from a 10 per cent cut in the top corporation tax 
rate. Mendoza et al. (1994) construct their own ‘effective tax rates’ for consumption, labour 
and capital, which are computed as the ratio of the difference between the pre- and post-tax 
																																																								
5  They define distortionary taxes as taxes on income and profit, social security contributions, taxes on payroll and 
manpower, and property taxes. Non-distortionary taxes are therefore taxes on consumption. 
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value of (consumption, labour or capital) income to the value of these incomes at pre-tax 
prices.6 Using the effective tax rates, Mendoza et al. (1997) test the theoretical model 
outlined in the same study, finding that a 10 percentage point decrease in labour (capital) 
income taxes leads to an increase in the investment rate of 1.8 (1.0) per cent. However no 
significant relationship was uncovered when using GDP growth as the dependent variable. 
Whilst these methods may be a closer fit to the relevant theoretical models, in the sense that 
they attempt to estimate the marginal tax rate, the data requirements pose a severe limitation 
to applicability, especially across a large panel of countries. This goes some way to 
explaining why such an approach has not been regularly replicated in the empirical literature.  
An innovative approach that has been taken in more recent studies is to examine revenue-
neutral changes in the tax structure – that is, the effect on growth of changes in the tax 
structure, holding total tax receipts constant. By imposing the revenue-neutrality constraint, it 
is possible to ‘avoid the difficulty of taking account of how any changes in aggregate revenue 
might be reflected in changes in public expenditure’ (Arnold et al. 2011: F59). This approach 
is appealing in the sense that it allows the researcher to make use of datasets with rich 
information on the various components of taxation without requiring a similar level of 
coverage on the expenditure side. Arnold et al. (2011) find that a revenue-neutral increase in 
the share of income taxes (offset by a decrease in the share of consumption and property 
taxes) reduces GDP, measured in levels. Specifically, their results suggest that a percentage 
point increase in the share of income tax revenue leads to a reduction in the long-run level of 
GDP of between 0.25 and 1 per cent. Moreover they find that CIT have a stronger negative 
effect on GDP than PIT. Thus the authors find support for the theoretical predictions that 
consumption taxes are less distortive to growth than personal or corporate income taxes. 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) extend the analysis of Arnold et al. (2011) to a broader 
panel of countries, and consider per capita GDP growth as opposed to GDP in levels. Similar 
results are uncovered: revenue-neutral increases in income taxes, offset by decreases in 
consumption and property taxes, lead to slower long-run economic growth to the tune of 
between 0.07 and 0.14 per cent for a 1 percentage point shift. Results hold for high- and 
middle-income countries, but are less robust for low-income countries. 
Whilst there is some disparity over the best proxy for the marginal tax rate, it seems that 
results of studies in this field have reached similar conclusions. Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney 
et al. (2001), Lee and Gordon (2005), Arnold et al. (2011) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo 
(2012) all present evidence, using a variety of different proxies, that income taxes are more 
harmful for GDP or GDP growth than consumption taxes. Specifically, some of these papers 
separate the effects of PIT and CIT, arguing that the latter are the most harmful for growth.  
Returning to the questions posed at the start of this section, the existing evidence does 
suggest that taxes on corporate and personal income distort growth to a greater extent that 
those on consumption. By how much these taxes affect growth is wholly dependent on the 
proxy used as the tax variable in each case; the estimates discussed above however 
suggest only a modest impact of changes in tax rates or structure on economic growth. 
Turning to the question of where these effects have been seen, the vast majority of the 
aforementioned studies are consistent in that, to date, they have only considered OECD 
countries. To the best of our knowledge, the only papers to consider the effects amongst 
non-OECD (and specifically developing) countries have been those by Lee and Gordon 
(2005) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012). Whilst the former paper makes no attempt to 
distinguish between high- and low-income countries, Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) find 
that their main results hold for high- and middle-, but not for low-income, countries. Many 
previous studies have likely confined analyses to OECD countries as a result of (for 
example) data availability; it is important in our context to understand the channels through 
																																																								
6  Lee and Gordon (2005) argue that the effective tax rates measure nothing more than an average tax on labour income, 
as opposed to the marginal rate. 
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which fiscal policies can affect growth at all levels of development. The next section 
considers the characteristics of fiscal policies in developing countries. 
 
 
3  Fiscal policy and development  
 
Fiscal policy can, and indeed must, play an important role in the alleviation of poverty and the 
pursuit of development. For example, the UN Millennium Project (2005) estimates that low-
income countries may need to see their tax-GDP ratios increase by as much as 4 percentage 
points if the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are to be met. However the 
governments of developing countries face a very specific set of challenges with regard to the 
administration of fiscal policy. The primary concern is, of course, that of revenue mobilisation. 
It comes as little surprise that tax ratios are lower in developing, compared to advanced, 
economies; Table 1 highlights this. On average, tax revenue in low-income countries has 
been only around half as much as that in higher income categories over the last three 
decades. 
 
Table 1 Tax revenue as % of GDP7 
	
  1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Low-income 13.4 11.7 13.7 
Middle-income 13.7 14.2 15.9 
High-income 23.2 22.6 23.5 
OECD 25.7 25.1 25.5 
Source: ITCD GRD (2014).   
	
There are numerous explanations as to why the tax ratio remains low in developing 
countries:  
 
  i. Many still rely heavily on subsistence agriculture or the informal sector; according to 
the latest estimates from Schneider et al. (2010), the size of the average shadow 
economy in Sub-Saharan Africa was some 38.4 per cent of GDP, compared to an 
average of just 13.5 per cent in high-income OECD nations.8  
 
  ii. Tax avoidance by high-earning individuals is also a problem. The IMF (2011) promotes 
the view that vast revenue improvements can be realised by tackling this.9  
 
 iii. A further issue might arise where developing countries are locked in a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in order to attract investment from multinational corporations (OECD 2014).  
 
 iv. Low tax morale, perhaps as a result of citizens’ low level of trust in public officials or 
administrations, also impedes compliance (OECD 2013; OECD 2014); one must only 
look at responses to the relevant questions in, for example, the Afrobarometer or World 
Values Survey, in order to see this illustrated. 
 
																																																								
7  We define ‘tax revenue’ here as the sum of taxes on income, profits and capital gains, trade taxes and consumption 
taxes. See below for an explanation of this choice. 
8  The country in SSA with the largest informal sector in 2007 was Zimbabwe, at 62.7%, whilst the smallest in the OECD 
was Switzerland, at 8.1%.  
9  This might, for example, take the form of legal loopholes or the use of tax havens. 
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  v. Inefficient, underdeveloped or under-resourced institutions, alongside unreliable 
communications infrastructure (such as the internet), can hinder the efficiency of tax 
administration.  
 
 vi. Widespread illiteracy and low population density (Reizman and Slemrod 1987).  
 
vii. Vulnerability to shocks in commodity prices.  
 
viii. Damage caused to the tax base and administrations by conflict (IMF 2011).  
 
Tanzi and Zee’s conclusion (2000: 300), that ‘In developing countries, tax policy is often the 
art of the possible rather than the pursuit of the optimal’, is thus quite fitting. 
 
 
4  Trends in the data  
 
As a result of the aforementioned issues, the tax structure in low-income countries differs 
significantly to that in developed nations. Figure 1 illustrates this, with a look at the direct to 
indirect tax mix. Our data is from the GRD of ICTD, which is compiled from sources such as 
OECD and the IMF. This dataset offers the most complete country coverage (specifically with 
regards to developing countries) for the longest time period available. For an in-depth 
description, including a full discussion of the inherent limitations of such a dataset, see 
Prichard et al. (2014). We choose to divide the data into four income categories (see 
Appendix 2 for country lists) for the three decades covered by our sample. Countries are 
classed as low-, middle- and high-income according to historic purchasing power parity 
(PPP) GDP per capita levels; we include a separate category for OECD countries.10 It is 
immediately clear that low- and middle-income countries have been quite heavily reliant on 
indirect taxes, which have, for the period of our sample, comprised between 70-75 per cent 
of total tax revenue. This is compared to high-income countries, where the split is roughly 
50:50, and the sub-sample of OECD countries, which have collected around 55 per cent of 
revenue from direct taxes on average. 
 
  
																																																								
10  With data spanning 20 to 30 years, it would of course be unwise just to use the most recent GDP per capita figure in 
order to classify countries into low-, middle- or high-income. Using PPP GDP per capita, we divided the sample into 
three (according to the 33rd and 66th percentiles) for each year. Where a country moved groups, it was allocated to 
where it most often lay. As such we mirror the approach taken by Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), although 
ultimately our classifications differ somewhat.  
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Figure 1 Direct-indirect split by decade and income group  
 
		
	
	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Developing countries place a relatively heavy reliance on trade taxes such as import tariffs. 
Whilst this might be a result of protectionist policies, it is also true that trade taxes are 
cheaper and easier to collect than income or consumption taxes: tariffs can be collected at 
ports or border crossings, and thus the administration of such charges is more easily 
organised and collected than that of, say, an income tax on workers spread across the 
country. Yet too heavy a dependence on trade taxes has well-understood growth 
implications: the efficiency gains from exposure to international competition can greatly 
enhance the long-run growth potential not only for specific industries, but the economy as a 
whole. Trade liberalisation does however place significant revenue constraints on many low-
income countries, which might find limited scope to meet these needs by increasing standard 
consumption tax rates (IMF 2011). Furthermore, income taxes might not be an effective 
means to raise revenue, due to the fact that the majority of citizens may not actually earn 
enough to even be eligible to pay (Thirlwall 2006). 
 
Figures 2a-2d disaggregate tax revenue into three categories: direct taxes, taxes on goods 
and services, and taxes on international trade and transactions. The category ‘direct taxes’ 
includes personal income taxes, taxes on corporate profits and, where available, property 
taxes. We choose to concentrate on the aforementioned three categories due to relative 
consistency and comparability of the data across countries and sources.  
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Figure 2a Tax structure 1980-2009: low-income countries 
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
 
Figure 2b: Tax structure 1980-2009: middle-income countries 
	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure 2c Tax structure 1980-2009: high-income countries 
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
 
Figure 2d Tax structure 1980-2009: OECD countries 
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014) 
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What is immediately clear from Figure 2a is the initially high reliance on trade taxes in low-
income countries. In 1981, this makes up on average just below 40 per cent of total tax 
revenue. The general trend is away from such tariffs towards taxes on goods and services, 
such as VAT. Indeed, by 2009, trade taxes make up just 20 per cent of total revenue; across 
the same time period, taxes on goods and services increase from around 33 per cent to 
about 45 per cent of total revenue by the end of the period in question. This is certainly a 
reflection of the on-going global trend towards removing trade barriers, and also of the IMF 
recommendations that seek to encourage a move away from trade taxes towards taxes on 
goods and services. Taxes on income, profits and capital gains are relatively steady 
throughout the period, beginning at between 25 to 30 per cent of total revenue, with greater 
increases occurring in the 2000s seeing this figure grow to around 35 per cent. A similar 
trend can be seen in those countries classed as middle-income (Figure 2b), where trade 
taxes initially comprise around 35 per cent of total revenue, falling to between 15 and 20 per 
cent in the 2000s. The shift towards consumption taxes is more marked for this sample of 
countries: revenue for this category increases from around 35 to almost 50 per cent on 
average during the period in question. Direct taxes comprise a fairly constant 30 to 35 per 
cent of total revenue. Figure 2c displays the various revenue streams for high-income 
countries: such countries have clearly not been as reliant on trade taxes as others (they 
comprise around 6-7 per cent of total revenue in the 1980s, but this drops away to just 1 per 
cent by the end of the period in question), and have instead focused on consumption and 
income taxes to a much greater extent. High-income countries, perhaps as a result of more 
efficient tax collection and administration, are typically more reliant on direct taxes such as 
capital gains, corporation, or income taxes. What is more, the relative stability of the tax 
structure in high-income countries is noticeable. Many are members of free trade areas such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union (EU), and as 
such the replacement of trade barriers with consumption taxes may well have occurred 
before the timeframe in question in this study. It is noticeable that almost all the changes in 
structure for high-income countries have seen a shift from trade to consumption taxes; direct 
taxes comprise between 50 and 55 per cent of revenue for the period.11 The trends in Figure 
2d, for OECD countries only, are similar, although trade taxes comprise a marginally lower 
portion of revenue in the 1980s. 
 
In Figures 3a and 3b we subdivide direct taxes into personal and corporate income taxes 
(PIT and CIT respectively).12 A couple of limitations apply when disaggregating the data this 
far. Firstly, the sample size is reduced to around sixty-five countries per year; this loss of 
observations is felt most strongly pre-1990, where, after classing countries according to 
income group, the sample becomes too small to provide meaningful statistics. As such it is 
more insightful to only present the data from 1990 onwards, and to group low- and middle-
income countries together.13 The insights are, however, clear: all countries in the sample rely 
on CIT to a similar extent, between 10 and 15 per cent on average. Interestingly, however, 
we see that PIT constitute a much greater portion of revenue in high-income countries (35-40 
per cent for the period), compared to low- or middle-income (around 10-11 per cent). This is 
likely to be a reflection of some of the aforementioned issues: low incomes, large shadow 
economies and low population density make raising revenue from PIT difficult.  
 
  
																																																								
11  NB. We choose to omit Bahrain and Gabon from the high-income sample. These countries had a disproportionately 
high level of trade revenue (50 and 69 per cent respectively).  
12  The sum of these two differs somewhat from the ‘direct’ category used in Figures 2a-d. The corresponding residual can 
thus be apportioned to property or ‘other’ direct taxes. 
13  We do not show the ‘OECD countries only’ graph here in the interests of space, but given the substantial overlap with 
the high-income category, it brings little further insight.  
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Figure 3a: Tax structure, including subdivisions of income tax 1990-2009: low- and 
middle-income countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure 3b Tax structure, including subdivisions of income tax 1990-2009: high-income 
countries 
 
 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014).  
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Thus, much of the reform that has taken place in low- and middle-income countries over 
recent decades has seen a move away from reliance on trade taxes towards the introduction 
of consumption taxes such as VAT, as opposed to increases in income or profit taxes. 
Indeed, this is certainly a change that has been encouraged by the IMF (2011), who describe 
VAT as ‘the standard policy prescription’ for countries battling the revenue challenges that 
come from trade liberalisation. Specifically, they note that VAT is able to raise revenue in a 
way that is less distortive to economic activity than alternatives, whilst also having the 
advantage of being simpler to administer and comply with than, for example, an income 
tax.14 High-income and OECD countries have, at least for the duration of the sample 
considered, been more heavily reliant on direct taxes. The next section discusses the 
econometric methodology followed in order to estimate the effects of tax composition on 
GDP growth.  
 
 
5  Econometric approach 
 
This section outlines our empirical investigation into the impact of the tax structure on 
economic growth. In doing so, we follow the approach taken by much of the recent tax-
growth literature (inter alios Arnold et al. 2011; Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo 2012) by 
considering revenue-neutral changes in the tax structure, whilst controlling for the overall 
level of tax as a proportion of GDP. Examining revenue-neutral shifts in tax structure allows 
us to consider the effects of changes in tax policy on growth, without the need to take 
account of how changes in tax policy might be a result of changes in government 
expenditure (Arnold et al. 2011). Thus it avoids the requirement of similar levels of data on 
public expenditure as on tax revenue. Furthermore, given limitations on the availability of 
data on tax rates, we believe this approach represents the best available proxy for the 
marginal tax rate which is considered in the relevant theoretical models. We disaggregate tax 
revenue into different combinations of the categories used in Section 4. Thus interpreting the 
effect of, for example, a percentage point increase in the share of total revenue for the 
included category (categories), implies a percentage point reduction in the share of total 
revenue from the omitted category (categories). 
 
The basic model estimated is as follows 
 
∆ݕ௜௧ 	ൌ 	ܽ௜௧ ൅ 	ߚݏ௜௧௞ ൅ ߠ݄௜௧ ൅ ߛ݊௜௧ ൅ ߮ࢀ௜௧ ൅	ݑ௜௧     [1] 
 
where ∆ݕ௜௧ is annual growth in (log) GDP per capita, ݏ௜௧௞  is (log) investment in physical capital, 
k, as a share of GDP, ݄௜௧ is (log) average years of schooling,15 ݊௜௧ is growth in the (log) 
working age population and ࢀ௜௧ is a vector of tax variables, which includes tax receipts as a 
share of GDP and n-1 tax revenue categories which are expressed as a share of total 
revenue. Subscripts i and t denote countries and years respectively. Data for GDP, 
investment (fixed capital formation) and population come from the World Bank’s databank. 
Education data comes from the Barro and Lee (2013) education dataset. Finally, the tax 
variables are from the GRD (Prichard et al. 2014). A full set of summary statistics is listed in 
Appendix 1. These covariates are included as we wish to follow the relevant endogenous 
																																																								
14  Specifically, the IMF (2011) advocates that broadening the base of VAT would bring more significant revenue effects 
than increasing existing rates.  
15  The Barro and Lee (2013) data is only presented for 5-year intervals. We therefore use linear interpolation in order to 
obtain annual data. This approach is also taken in, for example, Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012). One could 
alternatively restrict the series to be constant for five-year intervals, but this would imply that improvements/ 
deteriorations in the human capital stock occur only every five years, which would be an inappropriate assumption. It is 
of course a strong assumption that the variable evolves according to a linear process in 5-year cycles, however it was 
rarely the case in the raw dataset that a country experienced both improvements and deteriorations in the timeframe 
considered. Thus we feel that the approach taken is the most accessible and appropriate.  
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growth models discussed above closely. Furthermore, this ensures comparability with related 
studies such as Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012). 
 
The choice of empirical approach taken with panel time series data, such as we have, results 
from certain assumptions made regarding the data. We present a range of results from 
estimators that impose different parameter restrictions, some of which account for the effects 
of common factors. The validity of the assumptions made can then be tested using a number 
of residual diagnostic tests.16 
 
In working with a large N, large T dataset, it is important to account for the fact that some 
unobserved common effects are likely to be correlated with the regressors or driving the error 
process for some (if not all) panel units. In a growth regression, such cross-sectional 
dependencies (CSD) or common effects could take the form of, for example, a global 
downturn, spillover effects, conflicts, etc. In reality it is not possible to isolate the effects 
themselves; there are likely to be many, affecting different countries to varying degrees. This 
issue can be addressed in three ways: (i) via a spatial approach (where a priori knowledge of 
the spatial weight matrix is required – for example, distance between countries, 
neighbourhood effects); (ii) explicit modelling of the CSD; or (iii) a residual multi-factor 
approach. The spatial approach does not allow for parameter heterogeneity, and to model 
the CSD would require knowledge of all the latent factors for a large N, large T panel is 
unrealistic; there could feasibly be any number of such effects at play. It is however possible 
to account for such spill-overs by augmenting the growth equation with cross-sectional 
averages of the dependent and independent variables; this is the procedure followed for the 
Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCEP) and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group 
(CMG) regressions below.17  
 
At one end of the scale, the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and Fixed Effects (FE) 
estimators restrict slope coefficients to be equal across panel units (ߚ௜ ൌ ߚ;	ߠ௜ ൌ 	ߠ;	ߛ௜ ൌߛ;	߮௜ ൌ ߮	, ∀݅ሻ, whilst also assuming that the effect of CSD is the same in all countries. An 
intermediate estimator, the CCEP estimator, interacts country dummies with cross-sectional 
averages of the dependent and independent variables in order to allow for a heterogeneous 
effect of CSD, whilst still imposing the restriction that ߚ௜ ൌ ߚ;	ߠ௜ ൌ 	ߠ;	ߛ௜ ൌ ߛ;	߮௜ ൌ ߮		∀. 
Intuitively, imposing parameter homogeneity in such a varied sample of countries seems like 
a strong assumption. Even if, in the very long run, countries do grow in a similar manner, our 
dataset spans at most only thirty years; this represents a mere snapshot in time, capturing a 
large cross section of countries at widely varying stages of development. As such it is 
desirable to examine the results from more flexible specifications. The Mean Group (MG) 
estimator allows for full parameter heterogeneity, and the CMG estimator is augmented with 
cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables, allowing for a 
heterogeneous impact of unobservable common factors. 
 
The Mean Group (MG) estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), estimates (via 
OLS) the equation 
 
ݕ௜௧	 ൌ 	 ܽ௜ ൅	ߚ௜ݔ௜௧ ൅	ߝ௜௧,						ߝ௜௧~݅݅݀ሺ0, ߪ௜ଶሻ      [2] 
 
individually for each cross-sectional unit, and reports an average. Thus it allows for full 
parameter heterogeneity. The CMG estimator, proposed by Pesaran (2006), augments the 
																																																								
16  The emerging panel time series literature offers a number of papers that have followed a similar approach in justifying 
the choice of estimator. For a more detailed discussion, see, for example, Eberhardt and Teal (2011) or Eberhardt et al. 
(2013). 
17  All estimations were carried out in STATA 12. We used the user written command xtmg (Eberhardt 2012) for the MG 
and CMG regressions, and applied the approach outlined in Eberhardt (2011) in order to estimate the CCEP 
regressions. Tests for cross-sectional dependence were carried out using the xtcd (Eberhardt 2011) and xtcsd (De 
Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006) commands. 
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MG regression [2] with cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables 
as follows.18 
  
ݕ௜௧	 ൌ 	 ܽ௜ ൅	ߚ௜ݔ௜௧ ൅	ܿଵݕ௧ ൅	ܿଶݔ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,     ߝ௜௧~݅݅݀ሺ0, ߪ௜ଶሻ     [3] 
 
This estimator has been found to be robust in the presence of various different latent factor 
structures (e.g. combinations of unobserved factors that drive the error process, the 
regressors, or combinations of both). Monte Carlo simulations in Coakley et al. (2006) found 
the CCEMG estimator to be the least biased and most efficient from a menu of ten 
alternative estimators, even in relatively small samples (N=30, T=100; N=20, T=30); Pesaran 
(2006) shows the performance of the CCEMG to be asymptotically unbiased, for both fixed T 
and ܶ →∞. Indeed he found the estimator to be satisfactorily unbiased in samples as small 
as T = 20. Furthermore, MG estimation has been proven capable of dealing with both I(0) 
and I(1) series, including the unobserved effects. 
 
 
6  Results  
 
6.1 Full sample 
 
This section presents results from various estimations of equation [1]. Tables 2a, 3a and 4a 
show results for those regressions where the coefficients are constrained to be equal across 
panel units (namely, the POLS, FE and CCEP estimators), whilst Tables 2b, 3b and 4b show 
results for the same regressions carried out using the MG and CMG techniques. Time 
dummies or trends are included where indicated.19 Whilst the full dataset contains 
information on tax revenue for around 190 countries, our sample is reduced in various ways. 
Firstly, we restrict the empirical analyses to those countries where ܶ	 ൒ 20. Secondly, there 
are various observations where tax accounting was inconsistent with surrounding years or of 
questionable quality, and so these observations have been excluded (see Prichard et al. 
(2014) for a thorough discussion of the limitations of the dataset). Finally, the availability and 
completeness of the control variables included differs from country to country. As such we 
are left with an unbalanced panel with N between 100 and 110; T is, on average, around 23.  
 
Turning to the results, in Table 2a we omit consumption and trade taxes. The revenue-
neutrality constraint implies that a point increase in direct taxes is offset by a point reduction 
in indirect taxes (consumption and trade). The estimates suggest that a percentage point 
increase in direct taxes has a negative and significant impact on the GDP growth rate. 
Depending on the specification, the associated reduction in GDP growth lies somewhere 
between 0.023 per cent and 0.1 per cent. Turning to Table 2b, the MG and CMG results 
suggest a similar relationship. The CMG results in column 4 suggest that the reduction in the 
GDP growth rate following a point increase in share of direct taxes is 0.13 per cent. We reject 
the H0 of cross-sectionally independent residuals in columns 1 and 2, but fail to reject in 3 
and 4. Therefore the latter results are preferred. Furthermore, the Root Mean Squared Error 
(RMSE) implies that the models in columns 3 and 4 are a superior fit.20  
																																																								
18  The cross-sectional averages themselves cannot be interpreted, so it is not possible to isolate the impact of any 
common effect on growth.  
19  Often, in an OLS or FE framework, data is averaged over 5-year time periods in order to capture business cycle effects. 
Whilst we do not follow this particular approach, our results are robust to the inclusion of 5-year period dummies. 
20  Non-stationary variables and/or residuals are often pervasive in panel time series contexts. Due to the unbalanced 
nature of our panel we have, at this stage, been unable to perform the necessary tests for stationarity of residuals. It is 
thus safest to assume that the problem exists and to treat the MG and CMG as the preferred specifications; these 
estimators have been shown capable of dealing with such issues. Furthermore, the tests for cross-sectional 
dependence also require a strongly balanced panel. The statistics shown were computed from identical models 
restricted to only those countries with more than 25 years of observations. In all cases the qualitative result of the 
regressions were the same. 
	 21
Table 2a Full sample, pooled specifications, indirect taxes omitted 
	
Pooled specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  POLS FE CCEP CCEP 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita     
Physical capital 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Human capital 0.004 0.023** 0.058 0.034 
  (0.003) (0.010) (0.039) (0.043) 
Population growth -0.237 -0.006 -0.272 -0.232 
  (0.162) (0.230) (0.182) (0.183) 
Tax revenue  0.00011 0.017* 0.032*** 0.032*** 
  (0.00015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Direct taxes         
Taxes on income, profits -0.00023*** -0.0006*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
& capital gains (0.00006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
          
Constant -0.07*** -0.154*** -0.373*** 15.548 
  (0.014) (0.035) (0.116) (36.569) 
N 2376 2376 2422 2422 
No. of countries 108 108 109 109 
CD test (p value) - - - - 
Omitted category Trade and consumption taxes (indirect)  
Trend - - - - 
Year dummies Yes Yes - Yes 
RMSE 0.039 0.038 - - 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses   
      
Source: ICTD GRD (2014) 
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Table 2b Full sample, heterogeneous specifications, indirect taxes omitted 
	
Heterogeneous specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  MG MG CMG CMG 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita     
Physical capital 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.072*** 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Human capital 0.080*** 0.127 0.042 0.126 
  (0.024) (0.115) (0.069) (0.148) 
Population growth -0.376 -0.681 -0.596 0.110 
  (0.342) (0.500) (0.483) (0.534) 
Tax revenue  0.014 0.023 0.024 0.020 
  (0.016) (0.173) (0.019)* (0.180) 
Direct taxes         
Taxes on income, profits -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0013*** 
and capital gains (0.00034) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
          
Constant -0.349*** -0.322* -0.325* -0.167 
  (0.076) (0.179) (0.196) (0.334) 
N 2357 2357 2357 2357 
No. of countries 103 103 103 103 
CD test (p value) 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 
Omitted category Trade and consumption taxes (indirect) 
Trend - Yes - Yes 
Year dummies - - - - 
RMSE 0.028 0.027 0.021 0.019 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses   
      
Source: ICTD GRD (2014) 
 
In Tables 3a and 3b, we omit trade taxes. In many ways this is perhaps the most interesting 
specification: one of the primary advantages of the ICTD dataset is the developing country 
coverage, and it is in these nations that the greatest shift away from trade taxes has been 
seen. This was highlighted in Figure 2 above. We again see more favourable CD test and 
RMSE statistics for the CMG estimations. From column 4, the coefficient attached to direct 
taxes’ share implies that a percentage point decrease in trade taxes leads to a 0.27 per cent 
decrease in the rate of per capita GDP growth. Interestingly, in some specifications there is 
weak evidence (i.e. at the 10 per cent level) of negative implications for GDP growth of an 
increase in consumption taxes offset by a decrease in trade taxes (column 2, Table 3b). 
However this result is not robust to having taken account of cross-sectional dependencies, 
and as such we would urge caution when drawing conclusions. 
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Table 3a Full sample, pooled specifications, trade taxes omitted 
	
Pooled specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  POLS FE CCEP CCEP 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita   
Physical capital 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Human capital 0.002 0.026** 0.085** 0.078 
  (0.003) (0.010) (0.042) (0.048) 
Population growth -0.131 -0.019 -0.269 -0.226*** 
  (0.187) (0.023) (0.198) (0.199) 
Tax revenue  0.006* 0.018* 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Direct taxes         
          
Taxes on income, profits -0.0002*** -0.0007*** -0.0017*** -0.0016*** 
& capital gains (0.00007) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.003) 
Indirect taxes         
          
Consumption taxes 0.00013* -0.0001 -0.0007** -0.0006** 
  (0.00007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Constant -0.104*** -0.151*** -0.466*** 3.760 
  (0.020) (0.036) (0.020) 24.065 
N 2376 2376 2422 2422 
No. of countries 108 108 109 109 
CD test (p value)         
Omitted category Trade taxes   
Trend - -     
Year dummies Yes Yes - Yes 
RMSE 0.039 0.038     
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
  
    
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table 3b Full sample, heterogeneous specifications, trade taxes omitted 
	
Heterogeneous specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  MG MG CMG CMG 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita   
Physical capital 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.081*** 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Human capital 0.103*** 0.093 0.017 0.049 
  (0.036) (0.112) (0.072) (0.160) 
Population growth -0.018 -0.162 -0.562 -0.610 
  (0.500) (0.573) (0.469) (0.550) 
Tax revenue  0.025 0.041** 0.014 0.027 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Direct taxes         
          
Taxes on income, profits -0.0019*** -0.0021*** -0.0016 -0.0027*** 
& capital gains (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0009) 
Indirect taxes         
          
Consumption taxes -0.0005 -0.0009* 0.0005 0.00003 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
Constant -0.334*** -0.316 0.086 -0.013 
  (0.086) (0.206) (0.257) (0.447) 
N 2357 2357 2357 2357 
No. of countries 103 103 103 103 
CD test (p value) 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.05 
Omitted category Trade taxes 
  
    
Trend - Yes - Yes 
Year dummies - - - - 
RMSE 0.027 0.026 0.019 0.018 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses   
   
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
In Tables 4a and 4b, we include direct and trade taxes’ share of total revenue, whilst omitting 
consumption taxes. We again see that any revenue-neutral increase in direct taxes, this time 
offset by a reduction in consumption taxes, is harmful for GDP growth rates. Notably, 
however, results in column 4 of Table 4b suggest a smaller negative coefficient than in Table 
3b; a percentage point increase in income taxes offset by a reduction in consumption taxes 
leads to a 0.17 per cent decrease in the rate of GDP growth. This is significantly less than 
that arising from a revenue-neutral decrease in trade taxes, which is around 0.27 per cent. 
Thus it seems apparent that reforms away from trade taxes towards either income or 
consumption taxes have not led to positive impacts on GDP growth rates. Of course, the 
primary aim of tax reform is an increase in revenue, which may translate to growth effects in 
the longer term via higher levels of government expenditure; however these effects are 
difficult to disentangle without relevant expenditure data. 
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Table 4a Full sample, pooled specifications, consumption taxes omitted 
	
Pooled specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  POLS FE CCEP CCEP 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita     
Physical capital 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Human capital 0.002 0.026** 0.085** 0.078 
  (0.003) (0.010) (0.042) (0.048) 
Population growth -0.131 -0.019 -0.269 -0.226 
  (0.187) (0.233) (0.198) (0.199) 
Tax revenue  0.006* 0.018* 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Direct taxes         
Taxes on income, profits -0.0003*** -0.0006** -0.010*** -0.0010*** 
& capital gains (0.00007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
          
Indirect taxes         
Trade taxes -.00013* -0.0001 0.0007** 0.0006** 
  (0.00007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Constant -0.091*** -0.165*** -1.049** -77.436 
  (0.018) (0.037) (0.422) (72.684) 
N 2376 2376 2422 2422 
No. of countries 108 108 109 109 
CD test (p value)         
Omitted category Consumption taxes     
Trend - -     
Year dummies Yes Yes - Yes 
RMSE 0.039 0.037     
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses   
      
Source: ICTD GRD (2014) 
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Table 4b Full sample, heterogeneous specifications, consumption taxes omitted 
	
Heterogeneous specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  MG MG CMG CMG 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita   
Physical capital 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.081*** 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Human capital 0.102*** 0.092 0.030 0.067 
  (0.036) (0.113) (0.069) (0.165) 
Population growth -0.173 -0.159 -0.574 -0.617 
  (0.500) (0.573) (0.471) (0.550) 
Tax revenue  0.025 0.041** 0.014 0.027 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Direct taxes         
Taxes on income, profits -0.001*** -0.0012** -0.0014*** -0.0017*** 
& capital gains (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
          
Indirect taxes         
Trade taxes 0.0005 0.0009* -0.0005 -0.0003 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Constant -0.442*** -0.376** -0.106 -0.309 
  (0.0005) (0.181) (0.328) (0.383) 
N 2357 2341 2357 2341 
No. of countries 103 101 103 101 
CD test (p value) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 
Omitted category Consumption taxes     
Trend - Yes - Yes 
Year dummies - - - - 
RMSE 0.027 0.026 0.019 0.018 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses   
     
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Table 5 displays results from a set of regressions that treat personal and corporate income 
taxes (PIT and CIT respectively) separately. As discussed above (Section 4) this requires 
using a smaller sample of just under ninety countries. Results suggest that revenue-neutral 
shifts towards PIT (either from trade or consumption taxes) are most harmful for growth. This 
result is in line with that of Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), who also find PIT are more 
growth-reducing than CIT. Estimates shown in columns 4 and 5 indicate that revenue-neutral 
shifts towards consumption taxes (offset by either PIT or CIT) have positive effects on the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. Indeed, the coefficient attached to PIT suggests a point 
increase in offset by trade or consumption taxes, holding the other categories constant, has a 
negative effect on GDP growth rates of around 0.4 per cent. It appears from columns 4 and 5 
that revenue-neutral shifts between the two types of income tax have no effect on growth 
rates.21 
 
																																																								
21  The results reported in Tables 2-4 are robust to restricting the sample to those countries used in Table 5. We report only 
the CMG results in this section; results from other specifications are available from authors upon request.  
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Table 5 CMG regressions, separate PIT and CIT categories 
	
CMG regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita 
Physical capital 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.098*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Human capital -0.100 -0.100 -0.062 -0.100 -0.100 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.086) (0.103) (0.103) 
Population growth -0.290 -0.290 -0.175 -0.290 -0.290 
  (0.428) (0.428) (0.429) (0.428) (0.428) 
Tax revenue  0.009 0.009 -0.004 0.009 0.009 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) 
Direct taxes           
            
PIT -0.0045** -0.004***     -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001)     (0.001) 
CIT 0.001 -0.002**   0.001   
  (0.002) (0.001)   (0.001)   
Indirect taxes           
            
Trade taxes   -0.0003 0.001 0.004** -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Consumption taxes 0.001   0.001** 0.004*** 0.002** 
  (0.002)   (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.091 0.230 0.286 0.116 0.777 
  (0.458) (0.351) (0.439) (0.502) (0.609) 
N 1787 1747 1787 1747 1747 
# of groups  88 83 88 83 83 
RMSE 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.013 
Omitted category Trade Consumption Direct PIT CIT 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Source ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
6.2 Results by country grouping 
 
Table 6 presents results from a set of MG estimations where the sample has been 
subdivided into low-, middle- and high-income, along with a separate category for OECD 
countries.22 
																																																								
22  We present results from MG estimations due to data limitations – when we attempted to run the same specifications 
using the CMG estimator, we were unable to obtain results for low-income countries, likely due to the smaller sample 
and more unbalanced data. (NB. This applies not only to the disaggregated tax data but also the other covariates 
included; missing observations for any one of the variables included leads to that country being dropped from the 
estimation.) Indeed for certain specifications we were also unable to obtain results for the middle-income countries. Our 
choice was between presenting results using our preferred estimator, or to present results from the full set of income 
categories. The latter was chosen, as the aim of the current section is to highlight differences across income groups. 
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Table 6 MG regressions by income group 
 
MG regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Income group Low Middle High OECD Low Middle High OECD 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita 
Physical capital 0.030 0.070*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.030 0.070*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 
  (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Human capital 0.227*** 0.178 0.065 0.048 0.227*** 0.178 0.065 0.048 
  (0.070) (0.172) (0.066) (0.076) (0.070) (0.172) (0.065) (0.076) 
Population growth 0.411 0.06 -2.385*** -2.340*** 0.411 0.06 -2.385*** -2.340*** 
  (1.445) (2.03) (0.860) (0.830) (1.445) (2.03) (0.860) (0.830) 
Tax revenue  -0.015 0.035 0.025 0.043 -0.015 0.035 0.025 0.043 
  (0.049) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) (0.049) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) 
Direct taxes                 
Taxes on income, profits                 
& capital gains                 
PIT -0.005** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.002* -0.0027** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
CIT 0.002 -0.002* 0.0005 0.002 0.0037* -0.002 0.0002 0.0007 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.0019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Indirect taxes                 
Trade taxes         -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
          (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Consumption taxes 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002         
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)         
Constant -0.217 -0.433 -0.442* -0.479 -0.315 -0.514 -0.552*** -0.631*** 
  (0.247) (0.553) (0.249) (0.343) (0.207) (0.601) (0.194) (0.223) 
N 356 519 872 750 356 519 872 750 
No. of countries 23 26 34 28 23 26 34 28 
CD test (p value)                 
Omitted category Trade taxes Consumption taxes 
RMSE 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.016 0.03 0.024 0.018 0.016 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses             
 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014) 
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Results from columns 1-4 indicate that revenue-neutral shifts away from trade taxes towards 
PIT have had a negative and significant impact on growth rates in low- and middle-income, 
but not in high-income, countries. This result is not surprising considering the relatively low 
share of trade taxes in high-income countries’ tax mix, and also the relative stability of their 
tax mix over the sample period. Results in columns 5-8 suggest that shifts away from 
consumption taxes towards income taxes are also harmful for growth; again it appears that 
this effect is primarily felt through revenue-neutral increases in PIT, rather than CIT. 
Specifically, the effect is felt most strongly in middle-income countries, although the 
coefficient on PIT in OECD countries is also negative and significant. This is similar to the 
findings of Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), who find the greatest growth-reducing effect 
comes from PIT and social security contributions. Given that, at this stage, we have been 
unable to obtain estimates for this set of regressions using the CMG estimator, we advise 
caution in the reading of these results. The only other study to have attempted a similar 
analysis of countries by income group, Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), also met issues 
with data for low-income economies. These authors found little association between the tax 
policy variables and GDP growth rates; given the difficulties encountered here, we empathise 
with the complications faced when working with low-income countries. 
 
6.3 Excluding resource-rich countries  
 
In developing countries, growth is frequently driven by natural resource wealth. As a further 
robustness check on the aforementioned results, we treat countries where non-tax revenue 
exceeds 10 per cent of GDP as ‘resource rich’ and exclude them.23 Table 7 replicates 
selected CMG estimations from above as indicated. It is clear in almost all cases that the 
previous results remain robust. We do however see when replicating column 1 from Table 5 
that the previously reported result (revenue-neutral shifts from trade towards PIT was growth-
reducing) is no longer statistically significant. 
 
This exercise is repeated for the specifications where countries are divided according to 
income category; results are displayed in Table 8. We only display middle- and high-income 
countries, as the low-income and OECD categories remained unchanged following the 
exclusion of resource-rich countries. Again, the previous results are robust to the exclusion of 
these countries; the result that revenue-neutral increases in PIT, offset by reductions in 
consumption taxes, are harmful for growth in high-income countries is now significant at the 
5 per cent level. The coefficient estimates on PIT are larger for middle-income countries; 
again we urge caution when drawing conclusions, as these are results from the MG 
estimator, and as such do not account for cross-sectional dependencies.  
 
																																																								
23  The countries excluded as a result are: Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.  
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Table 7 CMG regressions excluding resource-rich countries  
 
(Table and column 
replicated) 
(2b, Col.3) (3b, Col.3) (4b, Col.3) (5, Col.1) (5, Col.2) 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita 
Physical capital 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) 
Human capital 0.042 0.046 0.017 0.069 0.030 0.068 -0.100 -0.101 -0.100 -0.101 
  (0.069) (0.067) (0.072) (0.079) (0.069) (0.079) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
Population growth -0.596 -0.517 -0.562 -0.432 -0.574 -0.381 -0.290 -1.075** -0.290 -1.075** 
  (0.483) (0.499) (0.469) (0.663) (0.471) (0.675) (0.428) (0.546) (0.428) (0.546) 
Tax revenue  0.024 0.023 0.014 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.008 
  (0.019)* (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.036) (0.027) (0.036) 
Direct taxes                     
Taxes on income, profits -0.0016*** -0.0013*** -0.0016 -0.0022** -0.0014*** -0.0011*         
& capital gains (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)         
PIT             -0.0045** -0.0035 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
              (0.002) (0.0024) (0.001) (0.001) 
CIT             0.001 0.0013 -0.002** -0.0007 
              (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0013) 
Indirect taxes                     
Trade taxes         -0.0005 0.0005     -0.0003 -0.0019 
          (0.0008) (0.0008)     (0.002) (0.0017) 
Consumption taxes     0.0005 -0.001     0.001 0.0021     
      (0.0008) (0.001)     (0.002) (0.0018)     
Constant -0.325* -0.622*** 0.086 -0.344 -0.106 -0.736** -0.091 0.046 0.230 -0.008 
  (0.196) (0.211) (0.257) (0.280) (0.328) (0.375) (0.458) (0.568) (0.351) (0.357) 
N 2357 2052 2357 2052 2357 1594 1787 1594 1747 1594 
No. of countries 103 91 103 91 103 75 88 75 83 75 
Omitted category Indirect Trade Consumption Indirect Consumption 
Resource-rich countries Included Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded 
RMSE 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.011 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses               
  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014) 
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Table 8 MG regressions by income group, excluding resource-rich countries 
	
Table and column 
replicated (6, Col.2) (6, Col.3) (6, Col.6) (6, Col.7) 
Income group Middle High Middle High 
Dependent variable ∆ Log GDP per capita             
Physical capital 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) 
Human capital 0.178 -0.041 0.065 0.053 0.178 -0.041 0.065 0.053 
  (0.172) (0.368) (0.066) (0.069) (0.172) (0.368) (0.065) (0.068) 
Population growth 0.06 0.201 -2.385*** -2.382 0.06 0.201 -2.385*** -2.382*** 
  (2.03) (2.117) (0.860) (0.680)*** (2.03) (2.117) (0.860) (0.680) 
Tax revenue  0.035 0.034 0.025 0.031 0.035 0.034 0.025 0.031 
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0..038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) 
Direct taxes                 
PIT -0.005*** -0.0064** -0.001 -0.0006 -0.006*** -0.0085*** -0.002* -0.0025** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0012) 
CIT -0.002* -0.0016 0.0005 0.0019 -0.002 -0.0019 0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) 
Indirect taxes                 
Trade taxes         0.001 0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 
          (0.001) (0.0008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Consumption taxes -0.001 -0.0001 0.001 0.0017         
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)         
Constant -0.433 -0.068 -0.442* -0.386 -0.514 -0.187 -0.552*** -0.545*** 
  (0.553) (0.889) (0.249) (0.264) (0.601) (0.871) (0.194) (0.198) 
N 519 401 872 837 519 401 872 837 
No. of countries 26 20 34 32 26 20 34 32 
Omitted category Trade taxes Trade taxes Consumption taxes Consumption taxes 
RMSE 0.030 0.022 0.016 0.016 0.030 0.022 0.016 0.016 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses         
 
Source: GRD (ICTD, 2014)  
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7  Limitations and possibilities for further 
research 
 
We acknowledge that a study of this nature brings with it a number of limitations. Firstly, it is 
inherently difficult to account for the fact that tax policy changes are often announced some 
time in advance of their implementation. Individuals and firms may therefore adjust their 
behaviour (which in turn influences GDP) before the tax rate itself has actually changed. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that there might be endogeneity in the sense that different 
taxes’ share of total revenue may change due to increased levels of economic activity in 
different sectors as a result of some reason other than a change in the tax rate. For example, 
the share of taxes collected from trade may increase relative to other categories simply as a 
result of an increase in the volume of trade. We attempt to account for this by running a 
robustness check on the results in Tables 3a and 3b, including a measure of openness to 
trade.24 Results, not shown but available upon request, are robust to the inclusion of this 
variable. This is, however, only a first attempt to tackle the endogeneity problem. Future 
solutions might involve averaging the data over 5-year periods in order to account for effects 
of the business cycle and following an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation method. There is 
however a trade-off involved: by employing an alternative estimator to tackle endogeneity, 
we potentially lose the ability to control for CSD; both issues can bias results.  
 
A further challenge is to account for (changes in) the efficiency of the collection of taxes, 
which has clear implications for GDP growth: even a well-designed tax system might be 
undermined by poor administration. However the human capital variable might go some way 
to capturing citizens’ ability to understand and comply with tax laws, and the inclusion of the 
tax level (as a share of GDP), to an extent, serves as a control for the ability of the 
government to administer the tax system.25 
 
We are also constrained, frustratingly so, by the scarcity of data for some of the covariates 
necessary in the empirical analysis. The GRD presents an excellent opportunity to examine 
the impacts of tax revenue on GDP growth for a very large sample of countries (around 200 
states), yet after including the necessary control variables our sample drops to at most 109 
countries.  
 
In terms of further research in the area, it would certainly be interesting to take a closer look 
at the results by country grouping: this work (along with the results in Acosta-Ormaechea and 
Yoo 2012) has suggested that different taxes affect different countries to different extents. 
Whilst MG estimation allows for full parameter (country) heterogeneity, and as such can be 
viewed as one of the most flexible approaches to panel data, the coefficient reported is a 
mean. Therefore we can only capture the average effect. Furthermore, the approach of ex 
ante classifying countries into groups based on, for example, income per head or some other 
economic variable is certainly not without its limitations. It might be appropriate in future work 
to employ alternative selection techniques that use the information contained within the 
dataset in order to sort countries.26  
 
 
																																																								
24  Following Arnold et al. (2011), we obtain the residuals from a regression of the volume of imports and exports on log 
population. This represents the part of trade that is not due to country size. 
25  That is, assuming that larger governments (proxied by larger tax/GDP figures) are more able to collect taxes. Of course 
this says nothing about the efficiency of tax collection, but it is plausible that where more people are employed in the 
public sector, tax collection may be more sophisticated. 
26  See, for example, Bos et al. (2010), for an example of a ‘latent class model’ approach to growth regressions. 
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8  Conclusions 
 
The main finding of this study, that revenue-neutral shifts towards income taxes are harmful 
for growth, is in line with the theory discussed in Section 1 and with much of the previous 
empirical work reviewed in Section 2. The magnitude of the effect is however worth 
examining: column 4 of Table 2b suggests that a percentage point increase in direct taxes, 
offset by a similar reduction in indirect taxes, leads to a fall in GDP growth rates of around  
-0.13 per cent. The results of a similar regression in Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), the 
paper closest to ours in spirit, suggest a smaller effect of around -0.07 per cent.27 Thus the 
effect is almost double in our sample. These authors, however, use the pooled mean group 
procedure, which constrains long-run coefficients to be equal.28 Our results are also 
comparable to those of Kneller et al. (1999), who find the effects of a revenue-neutral 
percentage point increase in direct taxation to have a negative effect of between 0.1 and 0.2 
per cent. Thus the exact magnitude of the effects uncovered is possibly driven by the choice 
of methodology and assumptions made concerning the data. In Table 5, we disaggregated 
direct tax revenue into PIT and CIT, finding that most of the negative growth effects are 
actually from revenue-neutral shifts towards the former. Again, this finding is similar to that 
uncovered by Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), although once again the coefficient 
estimate reported here is larger.  
 
The results in Table 4 are, as mentioned, potentially the most significant in a policy context, 
as a shift away from trade taxes has been the IMF’s policy prescription for developing 
countries for some time now. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first analysis that is 
able to explicitly consider revenue-neutral shifts away from trade taxes towards consumption 
or income taxes, which certainly validates efforts to improve the quality of such studies by 
drawing on higher-quality data. Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) bundle trade taxes into a 
broader category of ‘consumption and property taxes’, and do not take the chance to 
examine the consequence of a shift away from trade taxes towards other categories. Whilst 
we find no robust evidence that a shift towards consumption taxes has been harmful for 
growth, it is certainly not clear that it has been good for growth either. There is plenty of 
evidence to suggest, however, that shifts towards (specifically personal) income taxes have 
been harmful for growth. Given that the negative coefficient attached to income taxes is 
larger when considering the shift away from trade taxes than consumption taxes (see Tables 
3 and 4), we can tentatively conclude that such shifts have been the most harmful for 
economic growth rates.  
These results are intriguing, especially in light of the work of Baunsgaard and Keen (2010), 
whose findings highlighted that revenue recovery following trade liberalisation in middle- and 
low-income countries had also been poor. The present findings suggesting that revenue-
neutral shifts away from trade taxes have had a non-positive effect on GDP growth rates, 
and can be viewed as a further indication of the difficulties associated with tax reform and 
trade liberalisation.  
																																																								
27  See Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012: 21 Table 1). 
28  Whilst we do not fully agree with the parameter restrictions imposed by the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator used 
in Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), it would nonetheless be illustrative to replicate the results presented therein. We 
were however unable to do so using the method described in their paper. 
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Appendix 1 Summary statistics 
 
Variable Income group Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP) 
LI 868 18.93 8.98 -2.42 74.82 
MI 894 22.72 7.11 5.2 63.85 
HI 1124 23.09 5.32 4.35 46.95 
OECD 859 22.52 3.96 9.85 39.73 
Per capita GDP growth (%) 
LI 826 0.76 5.15 -64.08 31.31 
MI 857 1.98 4.55 -35.46 18.23 
HI 1079 1.94 3.28 -21.54 15.01 
OECD 823 1.97 2.8 -12.47 9.74 
Average years of schooling 
LI 914 3.57 1.54 0.62 7.65 
MI 953 6.88 2.05 0.23 11.04 
HI 1137 9.07 1.86 3.51 13.05 
OECD 866 9.44 1.83 3.55 13.05 
Growth of working age population 
(%) 
LI 848 2.79 1.02 -4.13 7.79 
MI 878 2.2 1.28 -2.06 13.38 
HI 1083 1.22 1.16 -1.23 10.82 
OECD 827 0.95 0.84 -1.23 4.83 
Tax receipts (% of GDP) 
LI 655 12.79 7.55 1.12 56.61 
MI 752 14.8 5.78 3.93 39.63 
HI 1094 23.08 8.59 1.2 49.52 
OECD 838 25.4 7.69 8.25 49.52 
Direct taxes (% of tax revenue) 
LI 655 29.34 10.89 10.23 65.36 
MI 752 30.92 13.58 0 77.25 
HI 1094 51.79 15.18 0 82.73 
OECD 838 54.67 13.65 16.17 82.73 
Consumption taxes (% of tax 
revenue) 
LI 655 38.01 15.69 6.8 75.71 
MI 752 43.79 18.06 1.36 99.74 
HI 1094 40.8 13.21 3.26 73.72 
OECD 838 42.78 12.48 16.26 73.71 
Trade taxes (% of tax revenue) 
LI 655 32.65 17.06 2.74 80.04 
MI 752 25.29 17.65 0 74.72 
HI 1094 7.61 14.6 0 96.74 
OECD 838 2.64 3.61 0 17.87 
PIT (% of tax revenue) 
LI 434 13.57 9.01 0 48.65 
MI 573 10.15 8.62 0 43.67 
HI 932 36.77 14 5.4 67.21 
OECD 784 39.29 13.33 5.4 67.21 
CIT (% of tax revenue) 
LI 434 13.37 8.02 1.87 69.75 
MI 573 16.74 10.09 0.06 61.74 
HI 932 13.64 7.3 0.92 48.54 
OECD 784 12.82 6.76 0.92 44.67 
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Appendix 2 Country list (full sample) 
Low-income: 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Côte D’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Middle-income: 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Rep. of the 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, 
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, 
Tonga, Uruguay, Republic of Yemen. 
High-income: 
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea 
Rep., Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
 
OECD: 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
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